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Abstract 
 
There is a growing body of evidence that interest rate spreads in Africa are higher for big banks 
compared to small banks. One concern is that big banks might be using their market power to 
charge higher lending rates as they become larger, more efficient, and unchallenged. In contrast, 
several studies found that when bank size increases beyond certain thresholds, diseconomies of 
scale are introduced that lead to inefficiency. In that case, we also would expect to see widened 
interest margins. This study examines the connection between bank size and efficiency to 
understand whether that relationship is influenced by exploitation of market power or economies 
of scale. Using a panel of 162 African banks for 2001–2011, we analyzed the empirical data 
using instrumental variables and fixed effects regressions, with overlapping and non-overlapping 
thresholds for bank size. We found two key results. First, bank size increases bank interest rate 
margins with an inverted U-shaped nexus. Second, market power and economies of scale do not 
increase or decrease the interest rate margins significantly. The main policy implication is that 
interest rate margins cannot be elucidated by either market power or economies of scale. Other 
implications are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa; banks; lending rates; efficiency; Quiet Life Hypothesis; 
competition 
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1. Introduction 
Over the decade since the 2008 financial crisis, the literature on banking and finance has seen 
renewed interest in a number of areas, including the nexus between loan growth, regulation, 
diversification, and competition, and the development indicators for risk, capital management, 
and efficiency of banks (Kashif et al. 2016; Bokpin 2016; Fanta 2016; Zheng et al. 2017; Ozili 
2017; Khraisha and Arthur 2018). Interest has also grown regarding banking industry 
performance in terms of allocation efficiency, risk management and profitability (Moudud-Ul-
Huq 2017; Hamdi et al. 2018), the application of manifold learning approaches (Huang and Kou 
2016; Yan et al. 2017), and the implications of Basel III for banking sector development 
(Ramlall and Mamode 2017). 
 
Financial intermediation represents the fundamental mission of banks to mobilize deposits into 
credit for economic operators. This paper was motivated by two main considerations in scholarly 
and policy circles: (1) the ongoing debate about the relationship between bank size and the 
efficiency of financial intermediation, and (2) gaps in the existing literature regarding this 
subject. Questions about the role of bank size in improving efficiency in the banking sector are 
reflected in the work of various researchers, including Asongu et al. (2016); Boateng et al. 
(2018), and Asongu and Odhiambo (2018). Existing research maintains that some big banks 
might abuse their market power instead of leveraging economies of scale to increase their 
efficiency in financial intermediation. The mechanisms for enhancing financial intermediation 
include, inter alia, increasing the quantity of loans, decreasing the price of loans (i.e., interest 
rates and fees), and reducing information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (Kusi et al. 
2017; Kusi and Opoku 2018; Tchamyou 2018a, 2018b). 
 
There is a growing body of evidence that for big banks in Africa, interest rate spreads are higher 
as compared to small banks (Beck and Hesse 2006; Ahokpossi 2013)2. Interest rate spreads have 
been used widely in the literature to indicate the level of banking sector efficiency (Dabla-Norris 
and Floerkemeier, 2007; Chortareas et al. 2012; Asongu 2017). Big banks are expected to have 
lower margins because they have more opportunities to leverage their size to achieve economies 
of scale. This capacity for leverage should allow the larger banks to benefit from lower funding 
costs compared to the smaller banks. Therefore, it would be reasonable to surmise that one of the 
                         
2
 Ahokpossi (2013, p. 1) concludes that policies that promote competition and reduce market concentration would 
help lower interest margins in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Beck and Hesse (2006, p.1) have also established that 
bank size significantly contributes to bank variation in spreads and margins. A case in point is the situation in Kenya 
where the high cost of loans is favorable to big banks over small lenders (Ngigi, 2013a, 2013b). 
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main benefits of bigger size would be gains in efficiency that transfer to the banks’ customers 
through higher deposit rates, lower lending rates, and lower overall interest spreads. However, 
research indicates that this expectation is not being met. Big banks worldwide continue to be 
more inefficient than their smaller counterparts, which is a paradox (Mitchell and Onvural 1996; 
Karray and Chichti 2013; Asongu et al. 2018a; Asongu and Biekpe 2018)3. Therefore, concerns 
are emerging about the role of bank size in improving efficiency in the banking sector (Karray 
and Chichti 2013). 
 
Two arguments have been put forward that attempt to explain this paradox. The first view holds 
that as big banks become bigger, more efficient, and unchallenged, they tend to abuse their 
power to exploit customers by creating monopolistic practices (Mitchell and Onvural 1996). The 
second argument is that increased bank size beyond certain thresholds introduces diseconomies 
of scale that in turn lead to inefficiency. According to this view, larger banks find themselves 
with higher and higher average costs as they grow beyond a crucial threshold, and these costs 
lead to wider interest margins and inefficiency (Berger et al. 1987; Noulas et al. 1990; Mester 
1992; Clark 1992; Karray and Chichti 2013)4. In other words, contrary to expectations, increased 
size beyond the identified threshold would widen interest margins to the detriment of customers. 
 
In the light of the above, the problem to be addressed can be stated as follows: “Is the 
relationship between bank size and efficiency influenced by exploitation of market power or 
economies of scale?” To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature regarding African 
financial development has not focused on this underlying question for banks5. This paper 
contributes to the literature by providing a deep examination of the connection between bank 
size and efficiency in Africa, with the concurrent goal of determining whether that association is 
influenced by abuse of market power or economies of scale. For this research, we used a panel of 
162 African banks with data for 2001–2011, and we analyzed the empirical evidence using 
instrumental variables and fixed effects regressions. Our research provided two key results. First, 
we found that bank size increases the interest rate margins enjoyed by a bank, following an 
                         
3
 Karray and Chichti (2013) have recently assessed a panel of 402 commercial banks from 15 developing countries 
for the period 2000-2003 and found high levels of scale inefficiency among the largest banks. 
4
 Consistent with Karray and Chichti (2013), a majority of studies have led to functions of estimated average cost 
with U-shaped profile. Accordingly, they decrease with size up to a certain value of total assets and unit costs rise 
beyond this level, indicating that it is the medium-sized banks that seem to have a more efficient scale than large and 
small banks. 
5
 Accordingly, the bulk of recent African financial development literature has not engaged the  problem statement 
(Daniel, 2017; Fowowe, 2014; Wale & Makina, 2017; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017;  Chikalipah, 2017; Bocher et al., 
2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Iyke & 
Odhiambo, 2017; Boadi et al., 2017; Triki & Gajigo, 2014). 
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inverted U-shaped curve. Second, market power and economies of scale do not increase or 
decrease the interest rate margins significantly. The main policy implication is that interest rate 
margins cannot be elucidated by market power or economies of scale. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related 
literature and clarification of the concepts used in this work. Section 3 presents our data and 
methodology, and the empirical results are given in Section 4. Section 5 provides our conclusion, 
including the implications of our findings and suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review and Clarification of Concepts  
2.1 Bank size, market power, and efficiency 
 
An examination of the existing literature reveals that there is no consensus about the relationship 
between bank size, market power, and efficiency. The research findings about the direction of 
the possible effects are subtle and sometimes ambiguous at best. In this section of the paper, we 
take a detailed look at the prior literature and the concepts related to our two lines of 
consideration: first, the relationship between bank size and efficiency, and second, the nexus 
between market power and efficiency. 
 
From an intuitive standpoint, we would expect to find a positive relationship between bank size 
and efficiency because larger banks are more likely to develop technical, financial, material, and 
human resources that enhance efficiency. However, since problems connected to agency, 
coordination, and other dysfunctionalities are more apparent in larger firms, we might expect 
their smaller counterparts to generate relatively higher efficiency scores6. In addition to the U-
shaped curve mentioned above, there is empirical evidence regarding economies of scale in the 
banking industry. Berger and Mester (1997) found that while bigger banks were slightly more 
cost effective, smaller banks were more cost efficient. Their results demonstrated that with 
increasing size, the banks studied were more able to increase control over costs, but they found it 
more difficult to generate income and profit efficiently. This position was shared by Srivastava 
(1999), who found higher average efficiencies for medium-sized banks, followed by large banks. 
                         
6
 Efficiency scores within the context of the study are based on cost efficiency, estimated with the translog cost 
function. The established association between bank size and efficiency is based on whether banks are fulfilling their 
fundamental mission of improving financial intermediation efficiency, notably: whether bank size generally 
increases financial intermediary inefficiency (or interest rate margins).  
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The finding that small banks were the least efficient confirmed the position that the nexus 
between these factors is not positively monotonic. No clear relationship between efficiencies and 
size has been established in the wealth of literature (Fukuyama 1993; Lang and Welzel 1996; 
Altunbas et al. 2000; Karray and Chichti 2013; Goldberg and Rai 1996; and Allen and Rai 
1996), which both negates and supports the hypothesis that larger banks are associated with 
higher levels of inefficiency. 
 
Empirical investigation of the connection between market power and efficiency has included 
testing the Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH). This view suggests that firms enjoy the advantages of 
market power in terms of forgone revenues and cost savings. According to this hypothesis, firms 
with higher market power put less effort into pursuing cost and profit efficiencies. Instead of 
leveraging their size to cut costs and increase intermediation efficiency, large banks prefer to 
enjoy a “quiet life” or the “exploitation of market power” to reap higher profit margins (Hicks 
1935; Maudos and De Guevara 2007; Vins and Koetter 2008; Coccorese and Pellecchia 2010; 
Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2018). 
 
2.2 Economies and efficiency in the banking industry 
 
In this part of the paper, we examine the seven economies of banking in terms of five main 
considerations: cost efficiency, revenue efficiency, captivity efficiency, concentration efficiency, 
and the view that includes Xefficiency, scale efficiency, and scope efficiency.   
 
Cost efficiency: Many authors have argued that size brings economies of scale and 
accompanying cost reductions (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Karray & Chichti, 2013). This view is 
based on the belief that unavoidable costs, such as branding, commercial networks, information 
and communication technology (ICT), and regulatory expenses, are more easily absorbed 
through large volumes of business. However, as highlighted earlier, the literature has instead 
documented a U-shaped nexus between bank size and the unit costs of banks. Moreover, large 
banks appear to work with more advanced technology, which potentially limits their economies 
of scale. 
 
Revenue efficiency: Consistent with De Keuleneer and Leszczynska (2012), revenue efficiency is 
determined by bank-specific factors or other independent variables rather than bank size. There 
is a threefold intuition motivating this line of thought. (1) Very large corporations use banks of 
 7 
all sizes, provided that the banks offer good services. Hence, the idea that large corporations 
request extensive privileges as a condition for dealing with a bank (or conversely, that large 
clients are the most profitable and loyal) is not always accurate. (2) It may be claimed that banks 
with large international networks can offer superior services. However, a good network of 
correspondent banks can offer services equivalent, or even superior, to a proprietary network 
whose foreign branches might be insignificant locally and of little added value. (3) Whereas 
better diversification of risk is also mentioned by advocates of large banks, risk diversification 
can be achieved in various ways, notably through credit syndications and various credit 
insurance mechanisms (Tchamyou et al. 2018). 
 
Captivity efficiency: In accordance with De Keuleneer and Leszczynska (2012), captivity 
efficiency focuses on the ambitions of large continental banks that aim to increase their control 
over the distribution of financial products. While controlling their investments according to the 
directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), these 
banks also underwrite all kinds of structured products that they distribute, leaving little choice to 
the clients they claim to advise. In so doing, they disclose little information to allow for 
transparent competition. Size procures an advantage in this kind of abuse. 
 
Concentration efficiency: The concept of concentration efficiency reflects the finding that many 
bankers still pursue size as an objective in spite of the lack of a proven nexus between size and 
efficiency or size and profitability (De Keuleneer and Leszczynska 2012). Advocates of this idea 
note that relative size within a market is useful because market concentration is rather 
well-correlated with higher profitability. Banking sectors with a higher degree of concentration 
enable banks to charge higher margins, which justifies higher remunerations for managers. 
 
X-efficiency, scale efficiency, and scope efficiency: In line with Wagenvoort and Schure (1999), 
this view holds that when assessing efficiency, a researcher should be interested in X-efficiency 
(whether banks use their available inputs efficiently), scale efficiency (whether banks produce 
the right amount of outputs), and scope efficiency (whether banks choose an efficient 
combination of outputs). 
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2.3 Measurements 
In this section, we discuss measures of market power and bank size, and indicators of efficiency 
and economies of scale. In the banking literature, market power is measured primarily with the 
Lerner index (Ariss 2010; Asongu et al. 2018b). This indicator measures the extent to which a 
bank can set prices above its marginal costs. An increase in the Lerner index is associated with 
greater market power. Two measures of bank size have been used predominantly in the 
literature: systemic and absolute bank size. Systemic bank size is measured either as the ratio of 
gross income to GDP (Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry 2011) or bank assets as a percentage of GDP. 
A bank’s absolute size may be defined as the log of total assets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry 
2011) or the ratio of bank total assets to total financial system assets (Beck et al. 1999). 
 
Of the five categories of efficiencies described in Section 2.2 above, the concepts of captivity 
and concentration efficiencies are not widely used in the empirical literature. Hence, we consider 
the other three main themes: revenue efficiency, cost efficiency, and economies of scale7. As we 
have already highlighted above, interest rate spreads are used to measure banking sector profit 
efficiency (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier 2007; Chortareas et al. 2012). Profit efficiency scores 
from the translog profit function are also indicators for revenue efficiency in the mainstream 
banking literature (Koetter and Vins 2008; Ariss 2010). Cost efficiency is measured with cost 
efficiency scores from the translog cost function (Koetter and Vins 2008; Ariss 2010; Coccorese 
and Pellecchia 2010). 
 
Economies of scale (ES) may be measured using various asset size classes (Wagenvoort and 
Schure 1999). Dummy variables are then assigned to these asset classes and used as independent 
variables in the cost equation. Returns to scale (RS) are appreciated based on parameter 
estimates. While Wagenvoort and Schure (1999) employed a Cobb-Douglas cost function, we 
use the translog to overcome some of the restrictive properties of the Cobb-Douglas approach, 
namely single product output and a log-linear cost curve. Consistent with Brown and O’Connor 
(1995 pp.7-8), from a translog cost function, ES is measured by the sum of the derivations in the 
cost equation with respect to output. A sum equal to one denotes constant RS, whereas a sum 
less (or greater) than one represents increasing (decreasing) RS. Accordingly, within the 
framework of this study, the ES variable is the sum of the derivation of Cost (lnC) with respect 
to Output or Loans (LnQ).  
 
                         
7
 Economies of scale and scale economies are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
3.1.1 Empirical estimation of market power (Lerner Index), economies of scale, and bank size 
Due to the panel structure of our dataset, we employ the stochastic frontier model of Battese and 
Coelli (1992) to estimate time varying cost efficiency scores. Consistent with Coccorese and 
Pellecchia (2010), this model presents some advantages in comparison with other approaches, 
especially those based on deterministic frontiers (Farrell 1957; Aigner and Chu 1968). The 
Battese and Coelli model accounts for the possibility that the deviation between the observed 
output and the frontier output could result from other factors, such as stochastic shocks and 
measurement errors, in addition to the firm’s own inefficiency. 
 
Let us assume that, for firm i at time t, production costs are a function of output (Q), input prices 
(W), inefficiency (u), and random error (v). With the last two terms independent and identically 
distributed (iid), the logarithmic specification of the cost function can be written as follows:  
ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln ,                                                                (1) 
 
where the error term and non-negative inefficiency terms are iid, following a normal distribution 
and a truncated normal distribution respectively. Hence, while itv is ²),0( vN  , itu  is 
²),( uN  . 
 
To model the cost, we use a translog function with three inputs and one output. This function, 
which was first proposed by Christensen et al. (1973) and then extended to a multiproduct 
framework (Brown et al. 1979), has been employed frequently for the assessment of the QLH in 
the banking literature (Koetter and Vins 2008; Coccorese and Pellecchia 2010; Ariss 2010; 
Asongu and Odhiambo 2018). The cost function is as follows: 
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where i 1,........N and t 1.........T denote index banks and time, respectively. C is the total cost, 
Q is the output, W h are factor prices, while it u and it v are the error and inefficiency terms, 
respectively. 
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where P it is the price charged by a bank for its output. In theory, the Lerner index can vary 
between 0 (in the case of perfect competition) and 1. As discussed in the preceding section 
(regarding the translog cost function), ES is measured by the sum of the derivations in the cost 
equation with respect to output (Brown & O’Connor, 1995). 
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Due to the constraints in the measurement of systemic bank size, we employ the absolute bank 
size measurement in this study. The % GDP-based bank size measurements are too small to 
produce summary statistics values that are comparable with other variables. Consequently, for 
the absolute bank size measurement for a given bank at a given period, we adopt the ratio of 
bank assets to total assets (bank assets plus other banks’ assets) for a given period in a given 
country (Beck et al. 1999). It is also interesting to note that we cannot use the logarithm of bank 
assets (Demirguç-Kunt & Harry, 2011, p. 6) because of differences in measurement (i.e., local 
currency) units. For the absolute bank size measurement, we use both overlapping (size<0.25, 
size<0.50, size<0.75) and non-overlapping thresholds8 (Wagenvoort & Schure, 1999). While 
only the results of the former are disclosed, the latter is used for robustness purposes. 
 
3.1.2 Testing the underlying “Quiet Life Hypothesis” (QLH) 
Given the focus of this research, testing the underlying hypothesis (i.e., the QLH) consists of 
assessing whether increasing the bank size beyond a certain threshold increases interest rate 
                         
8
 Bank size ≤ 0.10; 0.10<Bank Size ≤ 0.25; 0.25<Bank Size ≤ 0.50; 0.50<Bank Size ≤ 0.75; 0.75<Bank Size ≤ 0.90; 
0.90<Bank Size. 
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margins to the detriment of customers. To this end, for various asset classes (with overlapping 
and non-overlapping thresholds), we regressed the interest margin on the computed bank size, 
controlling for market- and bank-level variables as well as the unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity. 
 
To tackle the additional aspect of the problem addressed in this paper, we examined whether 
bank inefficiency resulting from the QLH hypothesis is the result of abuse of power or 
economies of scale. Hence, for the same asset classes (overlapping and non-overlapping) used in 
testing the underlying hypothesis, the QLH9 test was implemented for African banks by 
regressing the interest rate margin on the estimated Lerner index (LERNER), ES, and on a set of 
market- and bank-level variables (controlled for the unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity). 
A positive and statistically significant estimate of the variable corresponding to LERNER can be 
interpreted as evidence of the validity of the QLH. However, if the estimated coefficient 
corresponding to the ES variable increases (decreases) significantly with an improvement in 
asset classes, then inefficiency (efficiency) is attributable to ES. 
 
To tackle any issues of endogeneity that might arise, the LERNER, ES, and bank size variables 
were instrumented with their first lagged values. Accordingly, the LERNER variable could be 
endogenous because the efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis postulated a causal connection from 
efficiency to market power, ES, and bank size. 
  
3.2 Data 
To estimate the cost function, we specified one output and three inputs. Total operating cost was 
measured with overhead, output by total assets, and input by the price of deposits, price of labor, 
and price of capital10. The Lerner index was computed from the price and marginal cost (see Eq. 
(4)). While the marginal cost was computed from the translog cost function output (see Eq. (3) 
and Appendix 4), the price was given as the price charged by banks for their output (total assets), 
computed as the ratio between total revenues (interest income plus net noninterest income) and 
total assets. ES was computed from Eq. (5). 
 
                         
9
 Firms with higher market power put less effort in pursuing cost efficiency: instead of taking advantage of their 
favorable position by cutting costs, they prefer to enjoy a ‘quite life’ or an exploitation of market power (Hicks, 
1935; Maudos & De Guevara, 2007; Koetter & Vins, 2008; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
10
 The price of deposits is computed by dividing interest expenses by the sum of deposits, money market plus short 
term funding. The price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The price of capital is 
equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets. 
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We controlled for bank-level and market-oriented characteristics. The bank-level variables 
included the following.  
(1) Ratio of loans to total assets: In contrast to other bank assets, such as securities, lending 
requires more organizational capabilities and effort by the staff. Hence, if not properly 
performed, lending could generate inefficiencies.  
(2) Ratio of deposits to assets: While deposits are the main source of funds for banks, they also 
require good organization in order to be mobilized and well managed. Therefore, a higher 
proportion of deposits to liabilities could increase interest margins.  
(3) Number of bank branches: The number of branch banks is an essential consideration because 
a widespread branch network entails the creation and management of a retail organization. This 
effort could have either a negative or positive effect on cost efficiency. While we expect positive 
coefficients from the first two bank-level variables listed above for the reasons discussed, this 
third variable could have a negative or positive effect on interest margins depending on the 
coordination and organization of problems and opportunities linked to a bigger branch network. 
Therefore, the number of bank branches could also be a proxy for bank size. 
 
Next, we controlled for three main market variables: GDP growth, population density, and 
inflation.  
(1) The GDP growth rate was included to take into account the influence of business cycle 
fluctuations on efficiency. For instance, in dynamic and expanding markets, banks may benefit 
from growing demand, increased activity in branch offices, and expanded networking that could 
improve efficiency as a result. However, while exploiting the opportunities for short-run 
profitability, banks also might forgo efficiency. Consequently, the expected sign (positive or 
negative) cannot be anticipated with certainty.  
(2) The positive or negative impact of population density is also uncertain. In markets of high 
population density, it should be less costly to offer banking services. However, dealing with 
more customers could generate inefficiencies because of the need to meet all of their diverse 
requirements.  
(3) Intuitively, inflation should increase inefficiencies because of the risks associated with 
uncertainties. This expectation is consistent with evidence that inflation increases interest rates 
margins in SSA (Ahokpossi, 2013, p. 19). 
 
For this paper, our research sample consisted of 162 African banks from the Bankscope database 
for the period 2001–2011. In the Appendices, we present the summary statistics, correlation 
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analysis (showing the relationships among key variables used in the paper), definitions of 
variables and their corresponding sources, and estimates of the cost function. From the summary 
statistics (Appendix 1), we can infer that there was a sufficient degree of variation in the data to 
allow confidence that reasonable estimated connections would emerge. The objective of the 
correlation analysis (Appendix 2) was to mitigate issues of multicollinearity, and from an initial 
assessment, there were no concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated. There was no 
correlation higher than 0.500, which is the rule of thumb for the absence of multicollinearity. 
The highest correlation coefficient was 0.350. Moreover, the variance inflation factor was less 
than 10 (O’Brien, 2007). The definitions of variables (and corresponding sources) are provided 
in Appendix 3, while components of the cost function needed for the computation of marginal 
cost, the Lerner index, and ES are provided in Appendix 4. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
Table 1 presents our findings for the QLH, and Table 2 shows results for the main hypothesis. In 
both tables, Panel A is designed to control for unobserved heterogeneity, while Panel B is 
tailored to account for both observed heterogeneity and simultaneity. The first specification of 
each panel provides the baseline from which the effects of different asset thresholds are 
examined. 
 
Table 1 assesses two main concerns related to the QLH, notably whether: (1) bank size generally 
increases financial intermediation inefficiency (or interest rate margins), and (2) increasing bank 
size beyond a certain threshold increases interest rate margins further, to the detriment of the 
customers. The estimated coefficients and information criteria for model validity were 
significant consistently across thresholds and panels for the first specifications exclusively. For 
this reason, the following presentation and discussion of results for Table 1 are restricted to this 
set of specifications. 
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Table 1: Assessment of underlying hypothesis (overlapping Bank size thresholds) 
         
 Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Margin 
         
 Panel A: Controlling for the Unobserved Heterogeneity (FE regressions) 
  
 Baseline Size ≤ 0.25 Size ≤ 0.50 Size ≤ 0.75 
Constant  -17.380*** 9.275 -15.63*** 13.163 -16.10*** 13.090 -16.501*** 11.688* 
 (0.000) (0.104) (0.005) (0.106) (0.001) (0.053) (0.000) (0.060) 
Size 7.359** -1.841 32.865*** -6.581 21.152*** -4.119 15.441*** -3.222 
 (0.019) (0.189) (0.000) (0.569) (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) (0.468) 
GDPpcg -0.029 -0.018 -0.141** 0.032 -0.150** -0.0342 -0.137** -0.040 
 (0.550) (0.646) (0.045) (0.651) (0.025) (0.548) (0.035) (0.470) 
Inflation  0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.006 0.0003 -0.002 0.0006 -0.002 
 (0.713) (0.843) (0.401) (0.291) (0.965) (0.788) (0.928) (0.793) 
Pop. density 0.281*** 0.032 0.257*** -0.046 0.276*** -0.012 0.282*** 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.557) (0.000) (0.610) (0.000) (0.865) (0.000) (0.904) 
Loan/Assets --- -4.527 --- -4.218 --- -3.979 --- -4.759 
  (0.154)  (0.311)  (0.234)  (0.155) 
Deposit/Assets --- -2.704 --- -2.637 --- -2.805 --- -2.499 
  (0.532)  (0.648  (0.545)  (0.577) 
Bank Branches --- 0.121 --- 0.504 --- 0.128 --- 0.104 
  (0.383)  (0.193)  (0.466)  (0.517) 
         
R²(within) 0.144 0.021 0.221 0.027 0.189 0.019 0.173 0.020 
Fisher  10.24*** 0.92 33.32*** 6.85*** 17.95*** 0.78 15.53*** 0.94 
sigma_u 32.472 6.853 30.455 7.968 32.830 6.100 32.697 5.768 
sigma_e 4.050 3.197 4.329 3.638 4.117 3.377 4.069 3.345 
rho 0.984 0.821 0.980 0.827 0.984 0.765 0.984 0.748 
Banks 146 122 109 92 127 107 130 110 
Observations  737 468 514 327 610 402 641 419 
         
         
 Panel B: Controlling for endogeneity (FE Effects with IV regressions)  
   
 Baseline Size ≤ 0.25 Size ≤ 0.50 Size ≤ 0.75 
Constant  -12.601* 8.748 -13.481 14.150* -11.342 12.759* -10.797 11.802* 
 (0.062) (0.151) (0.128) (0.076) (0.151) (0.062) (0.152) (0.065) 
IVSize 8.392** -0.249 5.380* -4.429 6.483*** 2.444 5.358*** 0.103 
 (0.024) (0.900) (0.085) (0.246) (0.003) (0.122) (0.007) (0.962) 
GDPpcg -0.022 -0.016 -0.158* 0.0210 -0.143** -0.042 -0.137** -0.047 
 (0.659) (0.692) (0.063) (0.767) (0.043) (0.471) (0.043) (0.410) 
Inflation  0.0005 -0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001** -0.002 
 (0.942) (0.844) (0.808) (0.284) (0.806) (0.737) (0.807) (0.764) 
Pop. density 0.215*** 0.033 0.248** -0.056 0.230** -0.015 0.224** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.564) (0.018) (0.513) (0.017) (0.830) (0.014) (0.963) 
Loan/Assets --- -4.301 --- -4.096 --- -4.347 --- -4.822 
  (0.168)  (0.382)  (0.200)  (0.147) 
Deposit/Assets --- -2.886 --- -2.658 --- -3.231 --- -2.745 
  (0.510)  (0.652)  (0.489)  (0.545  ) 
Bank Branches --- 0.129 --- 0.488 --- 0.1741 --- 0.122 
  (0.352)  (0.218    (0.312)  (0.433) 
         
R²(within) 0.076 0.018 0.071 0.028 0.070 0.019 0.065 0.018 
Fisher  2.95** 0.88 2.99** 7.70*** 4.12*** 0.94 3.62*** 0.87 
sigma_u 25.193 6.949 30.556 8.664 28.384 6.177 27.212 5.691 
sigma_e 4.013 3.219 4.563 3.667 4.214 3.399 4.133 3.368 
rho 0.975 0.823 0.978 0.848 0.978 0.767 0.977 0.740 
Banks 144 122 107 92 125 107 128 110 
Observations  658 464 449 323 542 398 571 415 
         
*,**,***: significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FE: Fixed Effects. Size: Bank Size. IV: Instrumental Variable. IVSize: 
Instrumented Bank Size. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Pop. density: Population density.  
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Table 2:  Constraining with Bank Size (overlapping Bank size thresholds) 
         
 Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Margin 
         
 Panel A: Controlling for the Unobserved Heterogeneity (FE regressions) 
  
 Baseline Size ≤ 0.25 Size ≤ 0.50 Size ≤ 0.75 
Constant  205.897 205.07 184.386 199.596 176.131 158.287 197.983 176.516 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.359) (0.227) (0.289) (0.310) (0.167) (0.206) 
Lerner  1.302 1.494 0.761 1.184 0.894 1.017 0.845 0.959 
 (0.454) (0.444) (0.719) (0.612) (0.651) (0.638) (0.655) (0.638) 
ES -225.92 -222.89 -200.25 -213.458 -188.169 -165.13 -213.85 -187.545 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.389) (0.263) (0.323) (0.355) (0.191) (0.238) 
GDPpcg 0.032 -0.031 -0.011 0.028 -0.028 -0.041 -0.032 -0.0474 
 (0.380) (0.428) (0.869) (0.689) (0.611) (0.477) (0.551) (0.412) 
Inflation  0.001 -0.0003 0.011** 0.007 -.00003 -0.001 0.0002 -0.0009 
 (0.829) (0.967) (0.034) (0.311) (0.997) (0.904) (0.980) (0.910) 
Pop. density 0.100 0.099 0.068 0.020 0.056 0.044 0.0808 0.070 
 (0.190) (0.201) (0.622) (0.888) (0.615) (0.707) (0.385) (0.486) 
Loan/Assets --- -2.338 --- -2.600 --- -3.060 --- -3.063 
  (0.289)  (0.484)  (0.219)  (0.209) 
Deposit/Assets --- -3.666 --- -3.446 --- -4.159 --- -3.798 
  (0.373)  (0.547)  (0.357)  (0.378) 
Bank Branches --- 0.254 --- 0.671 --- 0.231 --- 0.227 
  (0.200)  (0.177)  (0.341)  (0.338) 
         
Adjusted R²(within) 0.026 0.043 0.018 0.043 0.016 0.033 0.022 0.036 
Fisher  0.64 1.48 9.30*** 7.74*** 0.54 1.00 0.75 1.17 
sigma_u 14.187 15.326 10.328 9.753 9.904 9.505 12.038 11.605 
sigma_e 2.987 3.236 3.575 3.674 3.264 (3.434) 3.188 3.399 
rho 0.957 0.957 0.892 0.875 0.902 0.884 0.9344 0.920 
Banks 132 118 95 89 111 103 115 106 
Observations  540 447 338 316 426 384 454 400 
         
         
 Panel B: Controlling for endogeneity (FE Effects with IV regressions)  
   
 Baseline Size ≤ 0.25 Size ≤ 0.50 Size ≤ 0.75 
Constant  79.954 62.016 39.372 12.227 52.258 7.352 75.642 51.023 
 (0.135) (0.142) (0.751) (0.885) (0.632) (0.927) (0.178) (0.241) 
Lerner  0.985 1.393 -0.052 0.347 0.170 0.337 0.452 0.764 
 (0.627) (0.537) (0.980) (0.884) (0.934) (0.878) (0.833) (0.739) 
IVES -84.649 -60.273 -33.208 4.109 -46.979 9.185 -75.702 -43.902 
 (0.165) (0.212) (0.817) (0.966) (0.708) (0.920) (0.237) (0.373) 
GDPpcg 0.0239 -0.0362 -0.019 0.030 -0.038 -0.039 -0.044 -0.047 
 (0.484) (0.496) (0.739) (0.680) (0.433) (0.507) (0.347) (0.420) 
Inflation  0.0003 -0.0006 0.008 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.966) (0.941) (0.052) (0.377) (0.823) (0.857) (0.867) (0.882) 
Pop. density 0.061 0.061 -0.007 -0.056 -0.002 -0.019 0.0332 0.028 
 (0.262) (0.329) (0.943) (0.640) (0.981) (0.838) (0.585) (0.707) 
Loan/Assets --- -5.253* --- -5.761 --- -5.574* --- -5.668* 
  (0.083)  (0.187)  (0.066)  (0.083) 
Deposit/Assets --- -4.487 --- -4.890 --- -5.269 --- -4.548 
  (0.371)  (0.468)  (0.318)  (0.375) 
Bank Branches --- 0.178 --- 0.514 --- 0.139 --- 0.1574 
  (0.364)  (0.315)  (0.557)  (0.514) 
         
Adjusted R²(within) 0.010 0.034 0.005 0.034 0.003 0.028 0.007 0.030 
Fisher  0.51 1.31 11.12*** 7.31*** 0.24 0.98 0.69 1.12 
sigma_u 9.254 10.026 5.428 8.751 6.268 6.379 7.691 6.983 
sigma_e 3.060 3.292 3.680 3.757 3.354 3.491 3.277 3.455 
rho 0.901 0.902 0.685 0.844 0.777 0.769 0.846 0.803 
Banks 132 118 95 89 111 103 115 106 
Observations  515 436 325 306 410 374 437 390 
         
*,**,***: significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FE: Fixed Effects. Size: Bank Size. ES: Economies of Scale. IV: 
Instrumental Variable. IVES: Instrumented Economies of Scale. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Pop. density: Population 
density. 
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From the weight of available empirical evidence, the following could be established. (1) The first 
part of the underlying hypothesis was confirmed because bank size significantly increased 
interest rate margins. (2) Concerning the second question, when we controlled for only 
unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., part of endogeneity), the second part of the QLH proved invalid 
because the increasing magnitude of larger banks across overlapping thresholds significantly 
mitigated the effect of bank size on interest rate margins (see Panel A). (3) When we accounted 
for endogeneity in the bank size measurement (see Panel B), there was evidence of an inverted 
U-shaped effect that validated the second part of the underlying hypothesis. In essence, while 
bank size increased interest rate margins from the first to the second threshold, the effect 
dropped from the second to the third threshold, reduced to a level almost similar to that of the 
first threshold. (4) The significant control variables had the expected signs. Population density 
had a positive effect because in markets of high population density, it is less costly to offer 
banking services. Improvement in GDP per capita growth does not necessarily translate into 
higher intermediary margins because economic prosperity in most of the sampled African 
countries has not been inclusive over the past decade (Chester, 2010; Asongu & le Roux, 2018), 
especially with respect to the longstanding issue of financial allocation efficiency (Asongu, 
2013). Accordingly, a majority of the elite that has benefited from this prosperity holds foreign 
bank accounts for obvious reasons. 
 
Given the demonstrated validity of the QLH, we proceeded to assess the second related question 
motivating the study: whether inefficiency is due to economies of scale or abuse of power. 
Unfortunately, for both panels of Table 2, the findings were not significant across the 
specifications, asset thresholds, and panels. Following the procedure used for Table 1, we 
replicated the analysis using non-overlapping thresholds, and found similar results. If statistical 
significance is overlooked, from the first threshold (i.e., Size ≤0.25), increasing interest margins 
or intermediation inefficiency was traceable to market power (Lerner)11, while the category of 
economies of scale was a source of intermediation efficiency. It follows that other factors explain 
significant variations in interest rate margins besides market power and economies of scale. 
 
4.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
                         
11
 It should be noted that IVLerner is not used in Panel B of Table 2 because its explanatory power (R²) is very low 
after instrumentation with first lags and first differences. Accordingly, while IVLener is perfectly synonymous to 
Lerner, it has a low R². 
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The following discussion of our findings proceeds in the light of the existing literature regarding 
bank size and efficiency, the QLH, and ES and efficiency. First, our results regarding the 
connection between bank size and efficiency were broadly consistent with the findings of 
Ahokpossi (2013, p. 1), who concluded that policies that promote competition and reduce market 
concentration help lower interest margins in SSA. Bank size contributed significantly to 
variations in bank spreads and margins (Beck and Hesse 2006, p. 1) since the high cost of loans 
was more favorable to big banks than small lenders (Ngigi, 2013a, b).  
 
Second, while our findings regarding the Quiet Life Hypothesis were statistically insignificant, 
they confirmed the potential for applying the QLH in the African banking industry. This 
evidence broadly confirmed mainstream findings by Tu and Chen (2000) in Taiwan for 1986–
1999, whose results were valid only before 1991; Casu and Girardone (2007) whose 
investigations regarding European banking from 2000–2005 employed a Granger causality test; 
Koetter and Vins (2008) for Germany from 1996–2006, although the magnitude of the estimated 
effects of the QLH were small; Schaeck and Cihak (2008) for Europe and the USA from 1995–
2005; Solis and Maudos (2008) regarding the loans market in Mexico for the years 1993–2005; 
Delis and Tsionas (2009) for Europe from 1996–2006, using a local maximum likelihood 
technique; Ariss (2010) in a sample of developing countries for cost efficiency; Coccorese and 
Pellecchia (2010) in Italy during 1992–2007, although the impact of market power on efficiency 
was not particularly remarkable in magnitude; and Asongu and Odhiambo (2018) in Africa.  
 
Third, since the negative, although insignificant effect of ES may also be synonymous with the 
absence of market power, our findings also were broadly in accordance with studies that have 
not validated the QLH, including Well (2004) in Europe for the years 1994–1999, who calibrated 
competition using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic; Maudos and De Guevara (2007) for Europe from 
1993–2002; Koetter et al. (2008) in the USA from 1986–2006; Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) 
who used Granger causality for their work regarding the Czech Republic from 1994–2005; Solis 
& Maudos (2008) for the deposits market in Mexico from 1993–2005; Al-Muharrami and 
Mathews (2009) in the Arab Gulf from 1993–2002; Fu and Heffeman (2009) for China during 
1985–2002; and Ariss (2010) for a sample of developing countries with respect to profit 
efficiency.  
 
It is vital to address the policy implications of the issues presented in this paper to ensure the 
soundness and regulation of the banking sector of Africa. The banking industry must have the 
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capacity to serve the economy with a degree of competition that is sufficient in productivity to 
provide for its customers. Therefore, based on the weight of available empirical evidence, we 
recommend that regulatory and government policies should aim to meet the following 
objectives:  
(1) Competition in the banking industry should be promoted in order to mitigate the potentially 
upward pressure of market power on interest margins to the detriment of customers.  
(2) Market concentration should be discouraged because an increase in bank size is not 
associated with intermediation efficiency. 
(3) Mergers and acquisitions should be discouraged if they lead to an increase in bank size 
beyond a mid-level threshold. This recommendation is based on the evidence found of an 
inverted U-shaped nexus in the relationship between bank size and inefficiency. 
 
Moreover, because the banking sector is more concentrated in SSA than in the rest of the world 
(Ahokpossi, 2013), policies designed to promote competition are important because they help to 
improve financial intermediation by lowering interest margins. However, given that markets tend 
to be small in SSA countries, the attendant policies should not focus exclusively on increasing 
the number of banks. Evidence indicates that increasing the number of banks within a small 
market framework to increase competition may not yield the desired outcome in Africa. The 
presence of a substantial number of financial institutions may not necessarily breed competition 
because there is a risk that banks may collude through channels such as bankers’ associations. 
The promotion of competition will result most feasibly from better enforcement of antitrust laws 
in particular, and from encouragement of laws that promote competition in general. Proper 
regulation is also indispensable because size provides large banks with many commercial 
opportunities that can amount to outright corruption tools. 
 
5. Conclusion, Caveats, and Directions for Future Research  
There is a growing body of evidence indicating that interest rate spreads in Africa are higher for 
big banks compared to small banks. Interest rate spreads have been used widely in the banking 
literature to indicate the level of banking sector efficiency. It is indisputable that big banks have 
opportunities to leverage their size to benefit from lower funding costs based on economies of 
scale as compared to small banks. Therefore, we would expect that one of the main benefits of 
big size would be gains in efficiency that transfer to the banks’ customers through higher deposit 
rates, lower lending rates, and lower overall interest spreads. However, this reduction in rates has 
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not occurred. Therefore, questions are emerging about the role of bank size in improving 
efficiency in the banking sector.  
 
One concern is that the big banks might be using their market power to charge higher lending 
rates as they become larger, more efficient, and unchallenged. However, several studies have 
found that increasing size beyond certain thresholds introduces diseconomies of scale that lead to 
inefficiency. Increased size beyond these thresholds would be expected to widen interest margins 
to the detriment of customers. Therefore, on the basis of these observations, the outlook for 
improving financial inclusion through mergers and consolidation is doubtful. The main question 
remains whether increased bank size is necessarily good for banking sector efficiency. 
 
Using a panel of 162 African banks for the period 2001–2011, this study examined the 
connection between bank size and efficiency to understand whether the relationship is influenced 
by exploitation of market power or economies of scale. We analyzed the empirical evidence 
using instrumental variables and fixed effects regressions. The following findings were 
established. First, bank size increased the interest rate margins enjoyed by banks, with an 
inverted U-shaped nexus. Second, market power and economies of scale did not increase or 
decrease the interest rate margins significantly. The main policy implication is that the interest 
rate margins cannot be elucidated by market power or economies of scale. 
 
The main caveat of this study is that our resulting policy recommendations are based on a broad 
sample of African countries that exhibit some significant heterogeneity. Future papers should 
aim to provide findings with more targeted country-specific implications. A step in this direction 
would be to place some emphasis on the legal origins of a country’s civil laws in the light of the 
work by Muazu and Alagidede (2017), who examined the nexus between information asymmetry 
and financial development. In addition, it would be worthwhile to apply the updated 
methodology from Tsionas et al. (2018) to estimate the interplay between efficiency and market 
power. They have developed a unified econometric approach for the formal assessment of the 
relationship between market power and cost efficiency. Their technique can accommodate a 
mutually dependent connection between market power and a financial firm’s cost efficiency. The 
framework allows for varying hierarchical orderings between a firm’s efficiency and market 
power, and does not place any prior restrictions on the sign of the connection between the two.  
 
 20 
In addition, improvements have been made in the computation of the Lerner index. A notable 
example is the stochastic frontier estimator of market power, an approach that can be used in 
both the primal framework and the dual cost function (Kumbhakar et al. 2012; Coccorese, 2014; 
Anginer et al. 2014).  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
 
Translog 
cost 
function 
variables 
Ln. Cost (C) 2.748 1.325 -1.468 5.667 1065 
Ln. Output (Q) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
Deposit Price (W1) 0.539 8.196 0.000 176.00 1031 
Labour Price (W2) 0.022 0.016 0.000 0.201 961 
Capital Price (W3) 1.733 3.884 -0.074 72.750 1043 
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
 
Bank level 
variables  
Loan/Assets  0.449 0.183 0.000 0.966 1092 
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
Output Price (P) 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
       
 
Other 
variables  
Interest Rate Margin  3.804 5.534 -23.620 27.310 1257 
Lerner Index  0.513 0.587 -13.787 0.969 894 
Bank Size  0.264 0.334 0.000 1.000 1267 
Economies of Scale  0.915 0.017 0.867 0.950 1091 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix 
           
Lerner GDPpcg Infl. Popden L/A D/A B.Brchs IRM BkSize ES  
1.000 0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.099 0.054 0.046 -0.171 0.016 0.083 Lerner 
 1.000 -0.034 -0.081 0.030 0.048 -0.057 0.033 0.077 0.029 GDPpcg 
  1.000 -0.052 -0.090 0.057 -0.012 0.024 -0.057 0.011 Infl.  
   1.000 -0.014 0.126 0.350 0.062 0.008 -0.119 Popden 
    1.000 -0.064 0.150 -0.165 0.064 0.309 L/A 
     1.000 0.028 0.293 0.159 0.285 D/A 
      1.000 -0.149 0.086 -0.157 B.Brchs 
       1.000 0.238 0.151 IRM 
        1.000 0.321 BkSize 
         1.000 ES 
           
Lerner: Lerner index. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popden: Population density. L/A: Loan on Total Assets. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. B. 
Brchs: Bank Branches. IRM: Interest Rate Margin. BkSize: Bank Size. ES: Economies of Sc 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Definitions of variables 
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  Sources 
    
Marginal Cost  MC The change in Total cost arising from a change in 
Output by one unit.  
Translog Cost Function 
    
Price  (charged on Output) P (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total Non-
Interest Operating Income)/Output 
BankScope 
    
Lerner Index  Lerner Firm’s market power ((P-MC)/P) Authors’ calculation 
    
Cost  C Total Operating Cost (Overheads) BankScope 
    
Output  Q Loans  BankScope 
    
Deposit Price W1 Total Interest Expense/Total Deposits, Money Market 
and Short-term Funding 
BankScope 
    
Labour Price W2 Personnel Expenses on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Capital Price  W3 Other Operating Expenses on Fixed Assets  BankScope 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Popden People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Loans/Assets  L/A Loans on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  B. Brchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Interest Rate Margin  IRM  Difference between ‘Interest Income on 
Loans/Average Gross Loans’ and ‘Interest Expense 
on Customer Deposits/Average Customer Deposit’ 
BankScope 
    
Bank Size  BkSize Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets in all 
Banks for a given period) 
BankScope 
    
Economies of Scale  ES Sum of derivatives of the Cost function with respect 
to Output.  
Authors’ calculation 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
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Appendix 4: Estimates of the Cost Function 
   
Parameters Regressors Coefficients Standard Errors 
    
0  Constant -0.2502** 0.1358 
Q  ln Q 0.8683*** 0.0331 
1  1lnW  0.0559 0.0623 
2  2ln W  0.5919*** 0.1143 
3  3lnW  0.2037*** 0.0557 
QQ    2ln 2Q  0.0127* 0.0067 
11    2ln 21W  -0.0139 0.0242 
22    2ln 22W  -0.1034* 0.0614 
33    2ln 23W  -0.0935*** 0.0262 
1Q  1lnln WQ  -0.0389*** 0.0086 
12  21 lnln WW   -0.0214 0.0305 
13  31 lnln WW   0.0335 0.0271 
2Q  2lnln WQ  -0.0068 0.0130 
23  32 lnln WW   -0.0240 0.0279 
3Q  3lnln WQ  0.0003 0.0078 
   
Log-likelihood 1021.2181 
Wald Chi-square 19818.07*** 
Observations 900 
Banks 151 
    
***, **,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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